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be complemented by evolutionary neuroscience. As shown below, 
far from reducing embodiment to neural processes, a neurological 
and evolutionary perspective on embodiment open up new vistas 
for neuroanthropologists to explore in studying cultural variation 
in human experience.
EMBODIMENT
As deﬁ  ned by anthropologists, embodiment is the subjective experi-
ence of the body, but not the physiological body (Csordas, 1990). As 
such, embodiment is generally considered to represent a culturally 
generated experience of the body and has been approached ethno-
graphically (Csordas, 1990, 1994), including its expression in ritual 
(Strathen and Stewart, 2008). However, because ethnography relies 
largely on verbal description, the term embodiment has  traditionally 
been limited to philosophical and/or ethnographic discourse, and 
carries post-modern connotations for many neuroscientists.
From the perspective of the neurosciences, the subjective 
  experience of the body must logically be instantiated in the brain. 
The neural questions underlying embodiment are clear: where is the 
subjective representation of body located and functionally  processed 
in the brain? And is such a representation highly integrative? A 
highly integrative representation of subjective somatic experience 
would make the neurological contribution to   embodiment more 
compelling, yet still require environmentally-speciﬁ  c   explanation 
in terms of variable expression.
Understanding embodiment in terms of its neurological 
  correlates allows for more holistic investigation into both inter-
nal psychological and external socio-cultural factors. Thus, 
neuroanthropology becomes a truly consilient perspective by 
which to tackle the cultural context of our evolved human 
brain. The infusion of evolutionary principles into areas of 
INTRODUCTION
The past few years have seen a call for interdisciplinary research on 
the brain, including Decade of the Mind (DOM), an international 
initiative for basic neuroscience research on the mind including 
mental health, high-level cognitive function, education, and intel-
ligent machines (Albus et al., 2007). Despite DOM’s interest in 
moving brain research beyond the clinic, to date anthropological 
research has not been well represented in such interdisciplinary 
discussions. At the same time, however, there has been growing 
interest in incorporating neuroscience perspectives into anthropol-
ogy, as exempliﬁ  ed by the Encultured Brain Conference, Oct 8th 
2009 at Notre Dame University.
Biological anthropology, with its concern for human brain 
evolution (Falk, 2004; Holloway, 2008), has embraced the insights 
of neuroscience into the origins of human cultural capacities 
(Deacon, 1998; Rilling, 2008). Social anthropology, on the other 
hand, with its focus on cultural variation in human experience, has 
been a philosophical holdout against “reductionist” neuroscience. 
However, recent research has made it clear that these three ﬁ  elds 
have much to offer one another in creating a holistic conception 
of the role of the evolved brain in human culture – welcome the 
heading of neuroanthropology.
Here we suggest that evolutionary neuroscience can be used to 
bridge knowledge obtained by social scientists with that obtained 
in the neurosciences for a more complete appreciation of the 
mind. More speciﬁ  cally, neuroscience can bring information about 
  neurological mechanisms, evolutionary processes and primate 
context to enrich more traditional anthropological perspectives 
on human experience. To demonstrate this point, we provide an 
example of how our understanding of embodiment, a term used by 
anthropologists to denote the subjective experience of the body, can 
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The anterior cingulate and insula have been implicated in other 
ritual healing practices as well. Ayahausca, a South American psy-
choactive plant tea, is known to have dramatic effects on bodily 
and emotional perceptions (Riba et al., 2001). Riba et al. (2006) 
report that the ingestion of ayahausca is associated with increased 
brain activity in the right anterior insula and the anterior cingulate 
cortex, consistent with previous ﬁ  ndings on the neural correlates 
of emotional embodiment, and empathy. Thus the ingestion of 
ayahausca by traditional shaman may be important in generating 
an empathetic state that allows them to experience the feelings of 
afﬂ  icted individuals during their spirit journey and facilitate  healing 
(Dobkin de Rios, 1984).
Interestingly, the involvement of the anterior cingulate cor-
tex and insula in meditation, yoga, and shamanic practices 
appears to be mirrored by the activation of both structures in 
long-term romantic relationships. This investigation is consist-
ent with Jankowiak and Fischer’s landmark study showing that 
romantic love, although culturally and idiosyncratically variable, 
is a cross-cultural and human universal (Jankowiak and Fischer, 
1992). Among individuals who reported being romantically in 
love, the anterior cingulate cortex and insula cortex were not very 
active during the ﬁ  rst 8 months (Aron et al., 2005), but become 
more active from 8 to 17 months (Aron et al., 2005; Fisher et al., 
2005). Further, Bartels and Zeki (2000) found that activation of 
the anterior cingulate and insula cortex were clearly involved in 
feelings of romantic love among individuals who reported being in 
love for an average of over 2 years. Alcorte and Sosis (2005) argue 
that one deﬁ  ning   experience of ritual is a feeling of intense joy 
(ritual can also invoke powerful negative feelings as well), a fea-
ture they associate with dopaminergic neurotransmission. Given 
activation of insula and anterior cingulate cortex in meditation, 
yoga, ingestion of ayahausca, as well as romantic love, spiritual 
healing practices may, in fact, as many of them claim, draw on the 
positive neurological experience of love.
EVOLUTION, SOCIALITY, AND THE PRIMATE BRAIN
Rilling (2008) has suggested that anthropologists might make 
their best contribution to a deeper understanding of the human 
brain by concentrating on the neural basis of behaviors uniquely 
developed in humans and critical to the evolution of the human 
brain, including language (Deacon, 1998), tool making (Stout and 
Chaminade, 2007; Stout et al., 2008), mental perspective-taking 
(Amodio and Frith, 2006), and altruism (Moll et al., 2006). We sug-
gest that emotional embodiment, that is the global representation 
of bodily status as somatic mood, is also critical to the evolution of 
the human brain and deserves special focus from neuroscientists 
and anthropologists alike.
Bodily awareness has been argued by numerous philosophers 
and neuroscientists, including William James and Antonio 
Damasio, as the basis of human consciousness (see Prinz, 2004 
for a more recent example). The insula and anterior cortex is 
not only central to elements of somatic awareness, such as pain 
(Singer et al., 2004; Jackson et al., 2006) but also to empathy 
(Lamm et al., 2009), racial group identity (Xu et al., 2009), social 
norm violation (King-Casas et al., 2008), and moral intuitions 
(Woodward and Allman, 2007), thus linking somatic awareness 
to social emotions.
 neuroscientiﬁ  c investigation have spurred intellectually reward-
ing   theoretical and predictive study, as demonstrated by Platek, 
et al. (2007) work on evolutionary cognitive neuroscience as 
a new and   emerging ﬁ  eld of inquiry. Similarly, neuroanthro-
pology   combines input from evolutionary biology, behavioral 
neuroscience, and cultural anthropology, to attempt a deeper 
appreciation of how the cultural context of the evolved brain 
can inﬂ  uence individual experience.
To begin to appreciate the physiology of embodiment, Craig 
refers to embodiment in terms of recent ﬁ  ndings demonstrating 
the integration of somatosensory, homeostatic, and emotional 
information within the insula – suggesting a speciﬁ  c location for 
a global somatic representation (Craig, 2002, 2009). The insula 
cortex is part of the cerebral cortex and lies deep within the lat-
eral sulcus, overlain by the opercula. The insula is at the base of 
the parietal lobe with important inputs from other sub-cortical 
structures including the thalamus, anterior cingulate cortex, and 
amygdala (Craig, 2002).
Such bodily representation is not to be confused with Penﬁ  eld’s 
famous homunculus map of the body represented in the cortex. 
Rather, embodiment may be best thought of as somatic mood, 
a feeling that is not closely tied to language, perhaps helping to 
account for the subjective and elusive nature of its linguistic descrip-
tion. In its positive form, it may be thought of as well-being. We 
will use the term emotional embodiment to distinguish the insular 
representation from the use of embodiment in conjunction with 
language and cognition (see for instance Clark, 2006).
EMBODIMENT AND RITUAL PRACTICES
The insula and anterior cingulate cortex have been implicated in 
recent studies of ritual spiritual practices, including meditation 
(Lazar et al., 2005; Lutz et al., 2009), yoga (Kakigi et al., 2005), and 
shamanism (Riba et al., 2006). Thus the neural correlates of emo-
tional embodiment not only reﬂ  ect our evolutionary heritage, but 
have become an object of cultural practice. In fact, ﬁ  ndings showing 
that individuals who are more aware of their own heart beat exhibit 
greater activation in the insula and experience stronger emotions 
(Critchley et al., 2004), suggest that some individuals may be more 
intrinsically skilled at such practices than others.
Recent ﬁ  ndings indicate that the relationship between  emotion, 
the insula, anterior cingulate cortex, and autonomic nervous  system 
function is central to meditation. For instance, experienced com-
passion meditators showed greater activation of the insula to nega-
tive sounds (Lutz et al., 2008) and such activation was more strongly 
tied to heartbeat relative to novices (Lutz et al., 2009). Lazar et al. 
(2005) report increased thickness of the insula among meditators 
who focused on internal awareness, suggesting long-term inter-
nal awareness can lead to increased development of the neural 
  structures of embodiment.
In a more exotic example, Kakigi et al. (2005) investigated brain 
activity in a Japanese yoga master who claimed to be impervious 
to pain while meditating. They report decreased activity in the 
insula and anterior cingulate cortex during meditation relative to 
a non-meditative state, regions already mentioned to be central to 
the emotional aspects of pain (Singer et al., 2004; Jackson et al., 
2006). More such studies are needed to see if such ﬁ  ndings are 
common among yogis who claim similar powers.Frontiers in Evolutionary Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  November  2009 | Volume  1 | Article  4 | 3
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 fairness may seem a long step from bodily awareness, it represents 
a   logical extension of threats to bodily awareness into the social 
sphere, or “social embodiment” (Singer, 2007). To the extent that 
others’ actions threaten bodily survival they are unlikely to be 
experienced as “fair”. Activation of the ACC under laboratory 
conditions of social exclusion (Eisenberger et al., 2003) suggests 
that fairness may be linked to survival because group exclusion 
is perceived as potentially threatening to survival.
The salience of the neural correlates of emotional embodiment 
extends to vocalization, language, and music, all important ele-
ments in ritual. Recent studies indicate that the insula is active 
in the response to the prosody or emotional content of language 
(Dietrich et al., 2008; Quadﬂ  ieg et al., 2008; Ethofer et al., 2009), 
laughing and crying (Sander and Scheich, 2005), and music listen-
ing (Brown et al., 2004). In fact, music and speech perception over-
lap in the insula (Brown et al. 2006), and the dorsal anterior insula 
may be speciﬁ  c for processing language and auditory information 
(Mutschler et al., 2009). While language may facilitate social com-
munication among larger human groups, its role in social cohesion 
is linked to emotional elements of vocalization clearly expressed in 
laughing, crying, and music.
EMBODIMENT AND BRAIN DEVELOPMENT
Biological anthropologists are particularly attuned to substantial 
population variation in somatic growth based on energy balance 
(the difference between consumption and output) related to sub-
sistence patterns and cultural consumption practices (Stinson, 
2000). However, much less attention has been given to the poten-
tial impact of energetics for population variation speciﬁ  cally in 
terms of brain development. This reﬂ  ects an assumption that 
the brain is prioritized for energy (Fehm et al., 2006) and hence 
should suffer little from variation in energy supply (Campbell, 
in press).
However, given that the development of the prefrontal cortex 
during the ﬁ  rst 15 years of life is directly related to glucose utiliza-
tion (Chugani, 1998), and that cortical development is a sequential 
hierarchical process (Gogtay et al., 2004; Shaw et al., 2008), brain 
development may be more sensitive to ﬂ  uctuations in energy avail-
ability than currently considered (Vaynman and Gomez-Pinilla, 
2006). More speciﬁ  cally, given that the insula and ACC exhibit 
elevated glucose utilization relative to the prefrontal cortex from 
the age of 6 years into the 20’s (Van Bogaert et al., 1998), food 
availability may have important implications for the development 
of emotional embodiment and hence empathy, notions of fairness, 
and artistic development.
There is relatively little evidence linking chronic undernutri-
tion to speciﬁ  c aspects of brain development in humans. However, 
recent ﬁ  ndings demonstrate altered insula activity in anorexia 
 nervosa (Nunn et al., 2008; Kaye et al., 2009). Altered insula activity 
is related not only to changes in the taste of food, but also distorted 
self-body perception (Sachdev et al., 2008). In addition, the size 
of the ACC is reduced in AN (Mühlau et al., 2007; McCormick 
et al., 2008), an effect that appears to reﬂ  ect the degree of weight 
loss (Mühlau et  al., 2007) and is reversible with weight gain 
(McCormick et al., 2008) Importantly, both the ability to indentify 
emotions (Miyake et al., 2009), and impaired cognitive set shifting 
(Zastrow et al., 2009) among individuals with AN have been related 
Based on anatomical evidence, Craig (2002) argues that the 
incorporation of C and Aδ nerve ﬁ  bers into the spinothalamic 
lamina I tract provides primates with an integrated representation 
of physiological status not found in other mammals. Such ﬁ  bers 
arise from nearly every cell of the body, including some that respond 
to lactic acid in muscle and provide information about peripheral 
metabolism processes. Furthermore, among primates, the termi-
nation of the tract in the posterior ventromedial nucleus with the 
thalamus (VMpo) means that all such information is integrated 
in a single location providing a global emotional representation of 
the body (Craig, 2002).
Compared to anthropoid primates however, the representation 
of somatic status appears to be elaborated in humans. Humans 
exhibit a relatively larger VMPo. While in non-human primates 
some of the spinothalamic lamina I neurons go directly to the 
orbitofrontal cortex, in humans, they all pass through the insula, 
in particular the right anterior insula (Craig, 2002). This allows 
for a fuller representation of somatic status, which is then passed 
on to the orbital frontal cortex where it serves as an hedonic input 
for decision-making (Wallis, 2007).
The social brain hypothesis holds that it is the demands of com-
plex social interactions in groups that have spurred the adaptive 
increase in brain size across the biological order Primates (Dunbar, 
1998, 2009), a relationship not found in other mammalian orders 
(Shultz and Dunbar, 2007). The importance of bonding among 
primates would explain why afﬁ  liation through physical touch 
initiates a neurochemical cascade, involving oxytocin and opiates, 
that is positively reinforcing and fundamental to effective social 
cohesion (Dunbar, 2010). While such neuroendocrine mechanisms 
remain important in human social interaction, they do not appear 
sufﬁ  cient to explain group cohesion among humans for whom 
language and technology form the foundation for greatly expanded 
spheres of social interaction.
Humans and the great apes (Hominidae), but not other primates, 
exhibit Von Economo neurons (VENs) linking both the fronto-
insular and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) to other areas of the 
prefrontal cortex (Nimchinsky et al., 1999). The density of VENs 
is related to the degree of sociality exhibited across the four genera 
of great apes – orangutans (Pongo), gorillas (Gorilla), chimpanzees 
(Pan), and humans (Homo). These ﬁ  ndings suggest a potentially 
similar role for emotional embodiment in complex social behavior, 
together with similarities in the prefrontal cortex, between humans 
and the other great apes (Semendeferi et al., 2002).
In humans, the neural correlates of emotional embodiment 
appear to be particularly well developed. Along with a large and 
well developed insula (Craig, 2009), humans demonstrate both 
greater density of VEN linking the ACC and insula relative to the 
apes (Nimchinsky et al., 1999) as well as the presence of VEN in 
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Fajardo et al., 2008). Allman 
and colleagues (Allman et al., 2001; Woodward and Allman, 2007) 
suggest that limbic/cortical connections through VENs provide a 
neural pathway for rapid processing of complex social information 
which they argue underlies so-called moral intuition (Woodward 
and Allman, 2007).
Importantly, both the insula and ACC are active in response to 
the perception of fairness in social interactions (Hsu et al., 2008; 
Tabibnia et al., 2008; Chiao et al., 2009). While the notion of Frontiers in Evolutionary Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  November  2009 | Volume  1 | Article  4 | 4
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much more difﬁ  cult, because of a lack of brain  imaging techniques 
that can be used in the ﬁ  eld. Thus much of the investigation of 
emotional embodiment in traditional   societies will have to rely 
on indirect methods, including questionnaires, neuropsychological 
tests, genetic and hormonal markers, and inferences from labora-
tory based brain imaging studies.
For instance, among male Arrial pastoralists from northern 
Kenya, self-reported quality of life, which may be thought of as a 
measure of well-being, is predicted by the number of male sup-
porters as well as amount of body fat (Campbell unpublished 
data). Other ﬁ  ndings demonstrate that DRD4 7R+ is positively 
related to BMI among nomadic Ariaal males (Eisenberg et al. 2008) 
while salivary T is positively related to measures of body fat in 
the same men (Campbell et al., 2007). Whether such biomarkers 
are also related to quality of life through their association with 
somatic status deserves more a detailed investigation of health, 
well-being and subjective mood among Ariaal men based on 
genetic variation in   neurotransmitters and salivary steroids, as 
well as cultural ideals.
SUMMARY
There is growing excitement among neuroscientists and social sci-
entists alike about the possibility of investigating the brain proc-
esses underlying those capacities for culture that seem uniquely 
human. We suggest here that an evolutionary framework for such 
a neurological perspective on the human brain highlights a pre-
existing primate neural system of emotional embodiment as a key 
element in human sociality. The phylogenetic elaboration of bodily 
awareness helps to suggest the elaboration of human romantic love 
into a wider set of positive social emotions and moral sentiments 
that act to maintain the cohesion of larger groups. In addition, it 
suggests that practices such as meditation, yoga, and shamanism 
are based on activating the neurological mechanisms associated 
with such positive social emotions.
The investigation of cultural variation’s inﬂ  uence on neu-
roplasticity is in its infancy. An evolutionary approach sug-
gests that the role of culture in human neuroplasticity is not 
a recent event, but extends throughout human brain evolution 
(Deacon, 1998). Hence the role of metabolic constraints (Fehm 
et al., 2006) is crucial to an evolutionary understanding of the 
way in which empathy and other social emotions are linked to 
somatic states. Thus the investigation of traditional cultures with 
deeply engrained cultural practices, high levels of habitual physi-
cal activity, and low caloric intake, has a critical role to play in 
neuroanthropology. However, the lack of suitable brain imaging 
methods for the ﬁ  eld means that such investigations, for now, 
will have to rely on indirect methods and courageous attempts 
at interdisciplinarity.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors thank Leslie Heywood for supportive discussion and 
comments, along with Paul Brodwin and two anonymous review-
ers for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. We also 
thank our Neuroanthropology colleagues for valuable discussion 
(see http://neuroanthropology.net/).
to alteration in the ACC, among other structures. Together these 
ﬁ  ndings implicate the ACC and insula in body perception, emotion, 
and intellectual performance, a combination of traits suggestive of 
emotional embodiment.
AN is a chronic pathological condition and hence represents 
an extreme case for the potential malleability of the insula and 
ACC in brain development. However, Kar et al. (2008) recently 
reported that a small sample of chronically unnourished children 
aged 5 to 10 years from India show reduced cognitive function. 
Deﬁ  cits included attention, working memory, learning and mem-
ory, and visuospatial ability but not motor speed and coordination. 
Furthermore, while attention scores increased with age among the 
malnourished children, those of design ﬂ  uency, working memory, 
visual construction, learning and memory did not. The authors 
conclude that chronic malnutrition speciﬁ  cally underlies deﬁ  cits 
in higher cognitive functions.
These results are especially important because the ages of 5 to 
10 years coincide with middle childhood, a time of elevated glu-
cose utilization and overall brain plasticity (Chugani, 1998), as well 
as important changes in social, emotional, and intellectual skills 
(Piaget, 1963), including the development of reason and respon-
sibility (White, 1996). Thus given the hierarchical and sequential 
nature of cortical maturation (Gogtay et al., 2004; Shaw et al., 
2008), alterations in brain development during this stage may have 
important consequences for the long-term maturation of emotion, 
social emotion, and morality.
Surprisingly, the role of physical activity in brain development 
may be particularly relevant in our own society. Recent work point-
ing to the importance of motor activity in the early development of 
the brain (Diamond, 2001) as well as the impact of physical exercise 
on learning in both school age children and adults (Ploughman, 
2008) are consistent with the continued importance of elevated 
levels of physical exercise thought to characterize our hunting and 
gathering ancestors (Vaynman and Gomez-Pinilla, 2006). Thus the 
simple recognition of the importance of physical activity for learn-
ing and the detrimental effects of a sedentary lifestyle as associated 
with video games and heavy use of the internet may do more for 
reviving our education and health care systems than any other 
single brain based pedagogical programs.
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
Cultural neuroscience is already revealing important dichoto-
mies in the activation of brain regions for such basic behaviors as 
response to fear faces (Chaio et al., 2008) as well the valuation of 
dominant and subordinate behaviors (Freeman et al., 2009) based 
on differences between Western and Eastern cultures. Such results 
demonstrate that cultural conditions can lead to discernable differ-
ences in the speciﬁ  c cues that activate fundamental brain structures 
such as the amygdala and mesolimbic reward pathways. We expect 
that similar comparisons of Western and Eastern cultures directed 
toward understanding the role of the ACC and insula in such top-
ics, as ritual, group identity, and romantic love will reveal similar 
differences based on habitual experience.
Extending such studies directly to traditional societies in which 
undernutrition, habitual levels of physical exercise, and even para-
sitic infections may represent important inputs in somatic mood, is Frontiers in Evolutionary Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  November  2009 | Volume  1 | Article  4 | 5
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